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Embedded Ethics: 
Discourse and Power in the New South Wales Police Service 
Abstract 
In this paper we report an ethnographic research study conducted in one of the 
world’s largest police organizations, the New South Wales Police Service. Our 
research question was: ‘how do forms of power shape organizational members’ 
ethical practices?’ We look at existing theories that propose the deployment of 
two interrelated arguments: that ethics are embedded in organizational practices 
and discourse at a micro-level of everyday organizational life, which is 
contrasted with a focus on the macro-organizational, institutional forces that are 
seen to have an impact on ethics. Resisting this distinction between the ‘micro’ 
and the ‘macro’ we build on these two bodies of knowledge to explain ethical 
change as deeply embedded in power relations that traverse the scale of social 
action. 
Keywords: ethics, power, practice, discourse, police organizations.  
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Introduction 
In this paper we ask ‘how do relations of power shape organizational members’ 
ethical practices?’ We address the question through both theoretical and 
empirical work. Theoretically, we review and question the argument that ethics 
are embedded in micro-organizational power relations and are subject to 
shaping by macro-institutional forms of power. We do so by looking at an 
ethical change initiatives in the New South Wales (NSW) Police Service as a 
situated practice in which the macro and the micro were mutually constitutive. 
As researchers, we were intrigued by the NSW Police Service’s attempts 
to reform their ethical practices; also, we were puzzled by the fact that, despite 
the public pressure and the considerable amount of resources committed to the 
reform, the concept of “ethical policing” seemed to be an elusive reform 
objective.  Hence, we decided to research the question of ‘how power relations 
shape organizational members’ ethical practices’.  Our analysis advances 
current theorizing in ethics and organization theory. To date, most approaches 
to how power shapes ethics in organizations propose either a micro-approach, 
derived from an ethnographic tradition (such as Jackall 1988), or a macro-
approach, derived from a more institutional perspective (such as Crank and 
Langworthy 1992). We supplement this theorizing by introducing analysis in 
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which micro- and macro-power relations interact in situated practices to shape 
ethics.  
The NSW Police Service represented a most interesting research subject: 
the Service was rife with corruption and unethical behaviour. In order to 
introduce more “efficient and ethical policing” (Ryan 2002) a macro-
organizational reform program designed to expunge ethically corrupt behaviour 
was instigated. The main thrust of the reforms was to shift formal power 
relations from a coercive bureaucracy into more democratic and team-based 
forms.  The idea behind these changes was that more democracy at the base of 
the organization would create space in which officers could resist corrupt 
tendencies and act more ethically rather than be subject to overbearing and 
corrupt authority. Power relations were addressed in the change program by 
reforming the formal rules, relations and protocols of the organization, in 
particular through the introduction of new routine situated practices within the 
existing bureaucracy. Notably, these were the Operations Control and Review 
(OCR) meeting and the Employee Management System (EMS). The boundaries 
of the OCR and the EMS were coextensive with a particular style of speaking, 
characteristic of the new style of reformed policing to which police were 
expected to conform. As our analysis of the OCR and the EMS will show, these 
practices were pivotal in the constitution of ethics. We will argue that power is 
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neither institutionally external to ethics nor is ethics somehow separated from 
institutional effects.          
In order to discuss our research question, we have structured our paper as 
follows: first, we prepare the theoretical context of our argument. Second, we 
introduce the research framework and provide an account of our methodology.  
Third, we report the findings of the study. We were able to identify a number of 
lenses that were situationally constructed and institutionalized within the Police 
Service. These culturally situated practices were complex, subtle, and 
distinctive (Philipsen, 1989/1990). Hence our contribution focuses on what 
happened in specific situational contexts in the Service and why it happened, 
rather than judging the observed practices. Finally, we discuss the implications 
of our findings for future theoretical work and management practice. 
Theoretical Framework  
Police organizations are a particular type of organization: they are essentially, 
bureaucratic and militaristic in character (Dandeker 1992; Battistelli 2008); 
however, this does not mean that their officers are tightly scripted and framed 
in their enactment of official roles. As Manning (2008: 678) notes, ‘performing 
in the interests of order is not the same as what the organization requires in 
formal bureaucratic terms’.  Because so much police work takes place in 
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improvised contexts that are subsequently and post-hoc tightly framed in terms 
of bureaucratic accountability, much of what is interesting about police 
organizational work is how police ‘rationalize or explain the whys and 
wherefores of that work’ (Manning 2008: 684). Thus, their work is highly 
situational and contextually specific, often taking place at a distance from the 
formal organization (Bittner, 1967; Jermier et al 1991). Not surprisingly, 
because of the fluid nature of policing as a practice, situated in many varied 
locales, much of  the organizational research that has been done is processual 
and ethnographic,  including Manning & Van Maanen (1978); Punch (1979); 
Van Maanen (1988); Finnane (1987, 1996); and Chan (1997). Seminal studies 
from symbolic interactionism and ethnomethodology, such as Bittner (1967) 
and Cicourel (1976) demonstrate that, while being subjected to strict 
bureaucratic controls, police have considerable discretion because they need to 
be able to read the streets to understand the moral frameworks of street players. 
Hence, ethics will be played out in practice in local scenes of action. 
 An emerging school of thought around the notion of ethics as practice 
(see Clegg et al, 2007; Carter et al, 2008) suggests that ethics are embedded in 
organizational power relations. Their theoretical proposition is that in order to 
theorize embedded ethics it is pivotal to study power relations. There are two 
distinct bodies of knowledge that are relevant, yet not discussed jointly.  
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 From a micro-organizational perspective scholars such as Knights and 
McCabe (1999) see a clear link between power and discourse, using Foucault 
(1977) to do so. Foucault’s core argument is that power and knowledge are 
mutually implicated in framing those truths that are held as self-evident and 
thus shape reality. In organization studies early contributions by Townley (e.g. 
1993) as well as more recent contributions by Halford and Leonard (2007) and 
Barratt (2008) make productive use of Foucault’s overall oeuvre of power-
related work.   
 The relation of rules to practice has long been considered analytically 
problematic. For instance, Gouldner (1954) argued that the meanings of rules is 
not inscribed in what they say but varies with the context of enactment. In his 
Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy Gouldner (1954) defined three types of 
norms (including a punishment centred bureaucracy) that operate 
simultaneously and create clashes in an organization’s norm system. From a 
philosophical standpoint, Wittgenstein (1968) stressed that rules are always 
interpreted and enacted situationally. Consequently, there is ample opportunity 
for unscripted norms to over-ride formal rules in action, which, is precisely 
when we would expect ethics to come into play – when rules and norms clash 
(Munro, 1992). 
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Given the situational nature of rules and their interpretation, it is more 
likely to be rule use, rather than rule existence, which will shape ethical 
conduct. Reforming power relations and rewriting the rules does not necessarily 
reform power practices or their ethicality. Jackall’s (1988) empirical research 
into the “moral rules-in-use that managers construct to guide their behaviour” 
found that “actual organizational moralities are … contextual, situational, 
highly specific, and, most often, unarticulated” (Jackall 1988: 4; 6). Research 
suggests that, in practice, ethics cannot be conceptualized as coterminous with 
rule-based codes (for example Clegg et al, 2007). Kjonstadt and Willmott 
(1995: 446) are especially critical about the relation between codification and 
conduct: “the provision of codes of conduct is an insufficient, and possibly a 
perverse, means of recognizing the significance, and promoting the 
development, of ethical corporate behaviour.” Such codes of conduct do not 
necessarily produce ethically sound practices (Munro 1992; Barker, 1993).  
 Organizational rules and practices are framed discursively, a central 
contribution of discourse analysis (Clegg 1975; Astley and Zammuto 1992; 
Alvesson and Karreman 2000a, 2000b; Boden 1994; Ford and Ford 1995; 
Czarniawaksa 1997; Deetz 1982; Iedema and Wodak 1999; Wodak and Meyer 
2001; Titscher et al 2000 Fairclough 1989; Fairclough et al, 2004). What rules 
are constituted as being is made up in and on occasions of everyday 
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organizational sensemaking, as Weick (1995), adapting freely from Garfinkel 
(1967), argues. Weick et al (2005) portray organizing in terms of members 
working out the local stories in which they find themselves. Hence, bringing 
action off as more or less legitimate will always be an effect of local discursive 
construct; thus, from the perspective of micro-practices, we are encouraged to 
see the moral universe in every piece of action and its accounting.  
Against the focus on the micro close observers of the police as an 
organization maintain that we also need to view scenes of action institutionally. 
For instance, Crank and Langworthy (1992: 342) argue that organizational 
practices and structures in a police organization “have a great deal to do with 
institutional values in its environment”. They suggest that the “incorporation of 
powerful myths into the structure and activities of police departments enables 
them to attain legitimacy; with legitimacy comes stability and protection from 
outside interference by powerful sovereign actors who are present in the 
enveloping institutional environment” (Crank and Langworthy, 1992: 338). 
The linkages between research into everyday discourse and more 
macro-organizational issues of legitimacy (Crank and Langworthy 1992) 
remain under-explored. Organizations adapt to external pressure ceremonially, 
and implement policies that show their commitments, as institutional theory has 
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stressed (Meyer and Rowan 1977). Institutional theory shares some 
resemblances with mundane theorizing in this respect: organizational actors 
often assume that those rules that an organization adopts will determine its 
members’ behaviour in what insitutionalists would see as a form of normative 
isomorphism. However, while such rules may sociologically frame the accounts 
that organization members’ make of their action they do not necessarily frame 
the action itself. Actions are always situated practices – sometimes far away 
from the formal rule-shaping policies. Policies are always played out in scenes 
of everyday working life, where events and local realities frame policy effects 
as they are articulated in practice, in quite unanticipated ways. Hence, if ethics 
are always situated in practices they cannot be seen apart from the power 
relations that frame and constitute those relations in specifically local situations 
and these practices may not simply be an anticipated effect of formal, 
institutionalized rules, as is evident from Foucauldian inspired micro-
perspectives on power in the recent literature (Hardy and Phillips 2004; Barratt, 
2008).  
In asking how relations of power shape organizational members’ ethical 
practices we are, of necessity, enquiring into the link between institutionalized 
myths and situated practices. The main myth recounted by police in NSW about 
who they are is that the Service is a ‘thin blue line’ between anarchy and order, 
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criminality and law. When the reality of policing in NSW was revealed by a 
series of media reports and commissions of inquiry to be far from the ‘truth’ 
depicted in this myth another myth was drawn into play by the new Police 
Commissioner appointed to clear up the corrupt mess. The alternate myth was 
one of change occurring through the process of a rational re-organization. When 
two institutionalized myths collide, the resulting contradiction will tend to be 
resolved ceremonially and ritualistically (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). The 
collision of two institutionalized myths derived from separate institutional 
universes, from police lore and management theory, is something that can only 
be reconciled in practice. The practices that sought to reconcile the myths of 
policing as the custodian of the moral order and the myth of rational 
organizational redesign were situated in a number of specific organizational 
innovations. It was in the situated practices of the OCR and the EMS that the 
collision of the two myths occurred and ethics was shaped. Here also, could be 
seen a collision and dissolution of the myths that there is, on the one hand, an 
institutional frame and, on the other, a local discourse, as the macro and the 
micro respectively. 
The Research and Methodological Framework 
Background to the NSW Police Service  
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The Service is one of the largest police organizations in the world. More than 
17,000 employees serve a population of seven million in the state of New South 
Wales, an area of over 800,000 square kilometres, equivalent in size to the US 
state of Texas.  However, they also frequently served a less public interest. In 
1997 the results of a Royal Commission, a statutory enquiry authorized by the 
state government with all the powers of a judicial body, revealed policing in 
NSW to be very different from the ethical values formally espoused by the 
Service: the Service was rife with unethical and corrupt behaviour, including 
the abuse of authority, the taking of bribes, providing false evidence, drug 
dealing, commissioning criminals to commit crimes, fixing internal promotions 
so that corrupted members were promoted, and the use of intimidation and 
stand-over tactics, as well as murder (Wood, 1997). The extent of corruption 
that occurred in the Service as highlighted by the Wood Report was a source of 
embarrassment to major stakeholders, especially the NSW Government, the 
Minister of Police, the media, and the electorate. Indeed, politically it was 
imperative that the Service be seen to be freeing itself of corruption. The 
Premier and the Minister wanted stories of corrupt police off the front pages of 
the newspapers well before the next state election. A ‘clean pair of hands’, 
untainted by any extant corruption, was recruited from the UK Police Academy 
in the person of a little known British Police Officer, a Mr. Peter Ryan.  
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Commissioner Ryan initiated a reform program aimed at achieving 
“ethical and cost efficient policing” (Ryan 2002). He regarded modern 
management concepts (empowerment, teams and flatter structures) to be the 
solution to the problems highlighted by Wood (1997). He initiated a departure 
from the traditional hierarchical and military structure and, over the next five 
years, diligently implemented a reform process employing contemporary 
theories of organizational design to combat unethical behaviour. There were 
two practices that were specifically designed to ensure ethical policing – the 
Employment Management System (EMS) and the Operations Control and 
Review Meeting (OCR).  These two change practices were pivotal in 
transforming the ethics of the Service.     
After five years Commissioner Ryan announced that the eradication of 
unethical and corrupt behaviour from the Service was in its final stage. It was 
front page news; so, unfortunately, shortly after his announcement, was the 
revelation of more secret tape recordings and other evidence that demonstrated 
the unethicality of the Service. Contrary to the Commissioner’s claims, "police 
were not just taking bribes but actively organizing crime, introducing one 
[drug] dealer to another and encouraging them to work harder … [which 
demonstrated that] corrupt police continued to operate without fear of or 
hindrance from anti-corruption measures introduced in the past five years” 
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(Divine 2001:16).  Clearly, Commissioner Ryan failed to achieve the objective 
of “ethical and cost efficient policing” (Ryan, 2002). 
The Research Setting 
The NSW Police Service underwent a program of structural redesign and 
behavioural reform introduced by Commissioner Ryan. In 2001, following a 
chance encounter with a colleague well-connected to the NSW Police Service, 
we were introduced to the Service’s Behavioural Change Team, which was 
seeking to implement the reform proposal foreshadowed by the Wood Royal 
Commission Report. We were introduced as members of a university seeking a 
requisite field setting for a major research project. We explained that we were 
ethnographers looking for insight into not just what is happening but also how 
and why it happens (Van Maanen 1988; Manning 1988; Silverman 2005). 
Following the successful introduction the first named author entered the field to 
conduct a two-year ethnographic research project in a Local Area Command 
(LAC), termed here the Wallaroo Local Area Command.  
The Wallaroo LAC was identified by one of the Service’s senior officers 
as the most advanced and successful in regard to the reform program’s aims and 
objectives. The Behavioural Change Team (the group’s name was later changed 
to the Crime Management Support Unit [CMSU]), had been working with the 
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LAC’s Commander and management team for more than two years, 
implementing new codes of conduct and introducing flatter structures and cross 
functional teams.  
Data Collection 
Over a period of two years the command’s officers and other employees were 
observed in everyday work activities. The first three months at the LAC were 
spent talking with members of the command, whose roles spread across 
management, intelligence gathering, operational (patrol officers), traffic control 
and criminal investigations (detectives). The objective at this early stage was to 
identify key players and activities in the transformation process.  
A schedule was established for visiting the LAC one to two days (6-8 
hours) a week. After six months, the data gathering process was extended, 
primarily through informal interviews, observations of naturally occurring 
interactions, and conversations with key players as well as from sources such as 
organizational memos, flyers, newsletters and public documents. The officers 
who were interviewed came from a variety of teams, positions and ethnicities, 
and from both genders. The interviews ranged from 10 minutes to three hours. 
The shorter interviews were conducted on the job: here the questions and 
answers were informal and mostly reflected the situation and task at hand. The 
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longer interviews were more formal and began with open-ended questions and 
an invitation for participants to tell their story in regard to the reform program. 
When the data collection ended we had accumulated more than 250 research 
hours of data, including 34 interviews which, along with field notes and other 
data sources, amounted to a dataset comprising 68 documents and 14,840 
paragraphs of text data. 
Data Analysis 
When working with large datasets it is important to gain access to the data most 
relevant to the study’s theoretical focus (Eisenhardt, 1989). To do this, we used 
the Nvivo qualitative software package which enables a researcher, while 
reading through transcripts of the data, to attach labels or codes to any portion 
of the text.  A portion of text can be labelled with multiple codes. The 
researcher can then perform software searches on these codes and group like 
coded data into categories for further analysis. We used this software to code 
and categorise each paragraph of data on the basis of both our a priori 
theoretical interest and grounded analysis.  
Wallaroo LAC’s change initiative sought to introduce a practical de-
differentiation of the social boundaries formulated by the existing highly 
bureaucratized organization structure. The rationale was to transform an 
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essentially authoritarian organization into one that was more participative and 
democratic. In these terms, we understood the change process to represent a 
movement from differentiation to de-differentiation, and from domination to 
democracy. We drew on the work of Clegg (1990) and Lash (1990) to construct 
an operational frame indicative of our theoretical interests. In brief, 
differentiation refers to phenomena or action that establishes vertical power 
differentials between people, and de-differentiation is phenomena or action that 
reduces power differentials between people. Accordingly, we allocated the code 
‘differentiation’ to text examples from the data in which officers referred to 
their power relations in terms of clearly defined differential boundaries. For 
example, an office might say something like, “I cannot question her because 
she out-ranks me”, or “I just do what he says because he is a detective”.  
We allocated the code ‘domination’ to those text examples that 
represented an unquestioned acceptance of a particular individual’s or group’s 
right to power. An example here might be characterised by officers saying, “I 
have learnt not to speak up, the consequences are too great” or, “I didn’t want 
to take it, but I was forced”.  
We allocated the code ‘de-differentiation’ to text examples that referred to 
established differential boundaries of power being blurred, usurped or 
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challenged in some way. Instances might include an officer openly challenging 
a superior in a work setting, or a memo announcing a structure and policy 
change that requires a usually autonomous group (such as detectives) to now 
report to an operational team leader. We allocated the code ‘democracy’ to text 
examples that represented power in more democratic terms. An example here 
might be a superior officer encouraging a subordinate officer to challenge his 
judgements, or a detective openly accepting a general duties officer questioning 
his investigation techniques.   
The major instrument of ethical change was to be organizational redesign. 
Accordingly, we also labelled text examples from the data with sub-codes 
representative of ‘structures’, ‘constraining forms’, ‘practices’ and/or ‘effects’. 
Portions of text that were allocated a sub-code indicative of ‘structures’ 
provided examples of overt architectures that constrained people’s behaviour, 
such as rank, hierarchy and functional divisions. Those allocated a sub-code 
indicative of ‘forms’ gave us examples of subtle and less readily observable 
forms of structural constraint such as ‘deference to seniority’ and a ‘code of 
silence’. The sub-code indicative of ‘practices’ provided examples of actual 
behaviours, while those allocated the sub-code of ‘effects’ gave us examples 
related to the effect that the events and behaviours referred to in the text had on 
the reform objectives.  
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We categorised the data by aggregating like-coded data together which 
resulted in the formation of five separate databases: 1) Power themes; 2) 
Structures; 3) Forms; 4) Practices; 5) Effects. Figure 1 illustrates the 
relationship between the databases (as per our research question) and the sub-
codes that emerged following our coding process on a grounded basis for the 
structures, forms, practices and effects databases. 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
We then drew on Strauss and Corbin’s (1990) theoretical sampling 
process and Gephart’s (1993) data saturation procedures to extract the data 
most theoretically relevant to our interests. The first step was to identify the 
frequency of occurrence of each sub-code in each database (see Table 1 for 
frequency counts). Data represented by frequently occurring sub-codes was 
aggregated while data represented by codes with a low frequency of occurrence 
was discarded.  
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
We used Nvivo software search tools to identify text examples coded with 
both a power theme sub-code (see figure 1) and sub-codes from the structure, 
forms, practices or effects databases. In short, we used the software 
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systematically to trace theoretical links across the databases, utilising, as per 
our research question, the power theme sub-codes as moderating variables. 
Once again, we aggregated the frequently occurring text examples to form a 
separate database, and discarded all other text examples. The result was a single 
dataset containing the most frequently occurring text examples coded with sub-
codes from the power themes, structure, forms, practices and effects databases – 
in short, the remaining dataset contained the data most relevant to our 
theoretical interests which we analysed qualitatively. 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
Having extracted the text examples illustrating how power relations shape 
the behaviour of officers, we focused subsequent analysis on ethics. 
Accordingly, we analysed each paragraph of text in this dataset to establish 
whether these text examples were more or less reproductive or transformative 
of the old and corrupt Service ethics.  
The Findings 
We divide the data analysis into a narrative in three sections to elucidate the 
story that unfolds. First, we explore the ways in which power relations are 
constituted historically; second, we show how these relations shape ethics in 
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practice, and third, we demonstrate how these power relations shape discourse, 
which, in turn, enacts ethics in practice. Pulling the themes together, we shed 
light on our overall research question: “how power relations shape 
organizational members’ ethical practices”. 
The historical constitution of forms of power   
The Royal Commission’s findings illustrated how strong discipline and a strict 
adherence to authoritarian principles of management constituted a culture of 
obedience and fear in the Service: even if one was not corrupt, one did not 
question the authority of superiors. As one officer appearing before the Royal 
Commission said: 
You weren’t there to lose. You were there to win. If that meant bending the rules, so be it 
… we didn’t see ourselves as criminals by assaulting someone or trying to put criminals 
behind bars. That was – you know the morality that we saw. […] My view of it is – and 
it's somewhat cynical – it’s a big game and the criminals tell lies, the police tell lies, or 
did tell lies, and if you, shall we say, played it by the rules the whole time, you’d lose 
(Wood 1997: 186). 
Rather than recent reform initiatives, past experience provided the most 
salient contemporary point of reference for the behaviours and attitudes of the 
police officers participating in our study. Our data shows that historically 
developed and legitimized practices shaped ethicality in practice. As our data 
shows, chief amongst these practices were numerous examples where officers 
made reference to the significance of obeying orders relayed by hierarchy. 
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While one might expect this in a police organisation, it had consequences for 
the reform objectives. For instance, while the researcher was travelling in a 
patrol vehicle, a General Duties Senior Constable explained that the ‘usual 
reaction’ of officers in supervising positions drew heavily on their past 
experience in the Service:  
[it] is just [a reflection of] all the people in that sort of era. They would say, “Who is 
the boss there?”  They would then, to justify their position, say "I don't necessarily 
agree with this but the boss said so and we've got to do it.”  […]  I knew full well 
that […] these people could have a voice and could have a say, but they chose not to 




The reform process had introduced flattened and team-based working 
structures in place of the old hierarchies. However, the relationship between 
team leaders and detectives was especially problematic because, traditionally, 
supervising officers naturally obey superiors. Despite being formally allocated 
to teams and expected to report to a team leader, detectives continued to act 
autonomously and to exercise their traditional discretionary power. Team 
leaders, despite their post-reform formal authority, continued to act 
deferentially when interacting with detectives. For instance, when asked by the 
researcher how he felt about having detectives reporting to him, a team leader 
said, “I haven’t had a problem with them, because really, on our shift, I don't 
see any of them” (Dbatlii1, Section 0, Paragraphs 242-268). The detectives in 
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his team did not bother to report to him. They just went about their business and 
he never followed them up. 
The fit between organizational members and the historical order of things 
is paramount. Without this fit, officers lose social acceptance and are 
marginalised. A NSW Police Service senior officer, who was a member of the 
Crime Management Support Unit, provides some historical insight into how 
cultural fit between people and the Service contributes to behaviour and 
attitudes:  
The need to fit in, in a police service, is higher than the need to fit in a University, 
and therefore, fitting in demands self-censorship from a very early age … because, 
too much lateral thought leads to challenge, leads to isolation. You have to 
demonstrate your credibility to fit in to a network (Drj24, Section 0, Paragraphs 34-
42). 
The officer is suggesting that the need to socially “fit in” to an already 
established discourse is such that it constrains the innovative capacity of 
officers who learn to think and act within a very clear set of social boundaries. 
Our data indicates that not only do officers act within the boundaries but the 
nature and relative position of the boundaries is controlled by political action. 
The boundaries and the power relations they establish are maintained through 
discipline and punishment, as explained in the following quote from a Team 
Leader:  
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When I first started in the job, when the Senior Sergeant called out, you said, "Shit, 
what have I been called for, Christ I am in trouble here." When an Inspector called, 
you would tremble in your boots. When a Superintendent called you, you would get 
your badge, because, you know, I am going to get my badge taken (Dbgt23Section 
0, Paragraph 34). 
The Team Leader’s view that a superior would only call an officer to 
punish him or her was widespread.  Note that he frames the exercise of 
punishment within a hierarchical frame, evident in his reference to increasing 
severity of the punishment that officers would expect from higher levels of the 
hierarchy.  
Commissioner Ryan acknowledged the problematic consequences of the 
Service’s punitive system, which his reform plan sought to change, as we have 
outlined. Despite this, officers continued to exercise forms of punishment.  As 
numerous officers commented independently, “punishment still pervades the 
organization” (Dddoopf, Section 0, Paragraphs 1-6). Although the reformed 
system espoused the need to empower officers, those who exercised their 
“voice” (Hirschman 1970) were routinely put on insubordination charges for 
“speaking their mind” (Dtgt30, Section 0, Paragraphs 309-357), especially 
when criticizing decisions made by higher ranking officers.  
The possibility of an insubordination charge, let alone it being carried out, 
does little to encourage lower level officers to move outside the historical 
boundaries of power and exercise their voice, although it does discourage 
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conflict. Ethically speaking, it facilitates compliance in which the first priority 
is to avoid a clash of values with those perceived to be in positions of power.  
In summary, our data indicates that a historically constituted, yet clearly 
understood “rule of anticipated reaction” (Friedrich, 1937) existed in the 
Service, whereby officers would not do certain things in anticipation of the 
probable results. Over time the enforcement of this unwritten rule resulted in a 
“mobilization of bias” (Schattschneider 1962) that privileged some officers 
with positions of dominance while marginalizing others, thus undermining the 
reform agenda of the Service and implementation of ethical change initiatives.    
How forms of power shape ethics in practice 
Goffman’s (1959) conception of social grammars helps us to understand 
interaction in the Service. Goffman argues that while social grammars are 
similar to norms people are unaware of how they constrain them. Ethics are 
enacted through these grammars which are used to decide whether behaviour is 
acceptable or not. The key to understanding the research question is that 
historically shaped power relations frame ethics in practice. As we have seen, 
historically, power relations in the Service were hierarchical and disciplining. 
Important outcomes for ethics in the Service followed; these power relations 
silenced critical voices and made ethics a matter of compliance.  
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Facilitating a plurality of voices was a central objective of the Service’s 
reform agenda. One of the key initiatives for achieving this objective was the 
introduction of the Employee Management System (EMS). The EMS was a 
software management system designed to help change the Service’s culture by, 
among other things, providing all officers with an official channel for 
exercising their voice. In theory, any officer could, at any time, sit at a 
computer, initialise the EMS, and report anything to do with internal operations 
that they believed to be ‘good’, ‘bad’, ‘unjust’ or ‘unethical’, including the 
practices of superior officers. They could officially challenge inappropriate 
behaviour on behalf of their superiors and peers.  At the time of its 
implementation Commissioner Ryan said that the EMS would be the practice to 
bring about cultural change and ultimately instil ethically sound practices in the 
Service (Ryan 1996; 1998; 2002). Instead, the EMS became another 
mechanism through which management could exercise punishment and 
domination: while the EMS provided an opportunity to enhance the Service’s 
institutional legitimacy in reality use of it remained within the narrow confines 
of the old social grammar of punishment and discipline.  
Participants provided numerous examples of how the EMS was used as a 
tool by officers in positions of power to coerce other officers into compliance. 
Senior officers also used it strategically to position themselves for promotion. 
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Several lower level officers and recruits on probation provided examples of 
their names being entered into the EMS for minor issues of perceived 
malfeasance by senior officers. Those in management or supervisory positions 
had increased their use of the EMS because using it had recently become a 
criterion on which they would be judged for promotion. A Team Leader 
provides an excellent example that describes how the EMS was being used in 
practice: 
Do you want to know something that is really interesting at the moment?  Very 
interesting, and it happens here, I've noticed. All of our complaints, or not all of 
them, but 90% of them, are coming from internal. It's no longer the public that rings 
up and says, I want to whinge about Constable so and so. It's, oh, you haven't got 
your nametag on, that's the third time in a row. I am going to put you on the EMS 
system […] Unless there is something I really deserve, but nine times out of 10, 
these are little shit things that can be solved with a straight conversation … ‘Look, 
you've done this mate, what is going on, what's the story, what your side of things?  
Oh, look, I am sorry, it won't happen again… blah, blah, blah … all right then, well, 
then consider yourself counselled and that's the end of the session, isn't it?’ … What 
they put on the system, what you're saying to them is, that's going to be used against 
you when you apply for a job. [The selection panel will say] ‘Hang on, you are on 
the bloody EMS system three times and you are saying you are the best Supervisor 
in the world?’  And they can use it, because they know it exists … so, suddenly my 
career path goes further down that way [pointing her finger to the ground], while his 
goes further that way [point her finger to the ceiling] (Dbatlii2, Section 0, 
Paragraphs 477-500). 
Fairclough (1989) suggests that language does not merely represent 
reality but rather constitutes it. Language frames reality, and by doing so it 
generates meaning and influences action. In our case, the informal language 
used to describe the EMS constituted its meaning in the Service. Moreover, the 
informal language used to describe a conversation contrasts with the much 
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more formal style required by the EMS. The typicality of this quote was 
supported by many other data examples, such as the one that follows, which 
was a informal conversation between the field researcher (RES) a new recruit 
(NR) and an experienced general duties officer (GD); it shows how it was 
largely being used with a supervisory gaze downwards, as a disciplinary 
mechanism for the lower ranks:  
RES: Tell me about the reform process here. 
GD: Everybody is out for themselves … like this EMS system [sic]. We 
know they put us on it so they can write down that they have 
counselled us [and hence used the EMS as they are now required]. It's 
about promotion. It's not about doing good policing. There is no trust 
in [working] relationships.  
RES: [Asked new recruit] Would you question a superior? 
NR: NO! 
RES:  Why? 
NR: I don’t know. 
RES: Where did you learn not to question - at the academy? 
NR: NO. It's like this. I was reprimanded for a report that I put in about 
break and enter by the crime manager and I said to her I was given 
different information, I spoke back to her. Since then she's been all 
over me for the minute things - I know her eyes are on me. 
GD: Yeah, it's about getting somebody, if you speak out you can expect to 
be got. 
RES: You mean, punished? 
GD: EXACTLY! 
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NR: Like, I asked George [GD, pseudonym] how to do something and he 
told me, I did it that way and the Duty Officer got stuck into me, 
telling me I did it wrong.  I went back to George [the GD] and the 
other guys and they said well, you've done it right, they didn't know 
what the Duty Officer was on about.  I was sort of stuck in between - I 
did it the way the Duty Officer said. 
RES: Why? 
NR: He is more higher [sic]. 
RES: Did you question him? 
NR: No way!  I have learnt very quickly not to do that. 
GD: The reason he wanted it changed was so his stats [on the use of the 
EMS] looked good. But that's not the job, them looking good is more 
important than doing the job. 
RES: Why don't you question them? 
GD: Because we end up on the EMS system. 
RES: Can't you put them on the EMS system?  
GD: Technically, yes.  Yes, [laughed] … But I can tell you that if I put a 
D.O. [Duty Officer] on the EMS he'd get me, my life would be hell. It 
is just something you don't do. 
RES: It sounds like you fear them? 
GD: EXACTLY!  I DO! (Dgoemsf, Section 0, Paragraphs 3-65) 
Taken as a whole, the data examples that refer to the EMS tell the story of 
how the EMS constituted a new discursive resource that organizational 
members drew upon to make sense of and negotiate their reality. Furthermore, 
the designers of the EMS neglected the political complexities of its specific 
social context. While, technically, lower level officers could report on their 
superiors, the unwritten “rule of anticipated reaction” (Friedrich, 1973) was 
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very much on their minds. In short, they were aware that if they made such a 
report they their careers were at risk.  
This finding is particularly relevant for our research question. Rather than 
giving lower level officers the voice they need to check the ethics of superior 
officers, the EMS facilitated their ongoing silence. It achieved the opposite of 
what was intended: it reinforced practices of discipline, punishment and 
domination.  Paradoxically, since pre-existing organizational power relations 
undermined and ultimately perverted the EMS, the EMS ensured that the ethics 
of the Service remained vulnerable. The EMS initiative that was meant to 
improve ethics in the Service did not so much change ethics as reinforce the 
practices it were designed to eradicate. 
How power relations are constituted, and constitute, discourse that shapes 
ethics in practice 
One of the many ways that power operates is through discourse (Fairclough, 
1989). Language is not merely a way of expressing ethics; rather language is 
performative and actively enacts and shapes reality, including ethical reality. 
For instance,  the Royal Commission revealed prior to our study that many 
police officers referred to their wrong doing as ‘noble cause corruption’ (Wood, 
1997). The term was widely understood in the Service to involve practices such 
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as fabricating and planting evidence to obtain a conviction against a person they 
believed deserved to be found guilty. Ultimately, the ends justified the means 
because such behaviour produced ostensibly ‘good’ convictions. Officers 
maintained that it was in the best interests of the public that they acted as they 
did. For them, collaborating with criminals and ‘green lighting’ certain acts of 
crime prevented worse crime occurring. Green lighting – another frequently 
used term to explain noble cause corruption – involved giving criminals who 
supplied information that led to the conviction of other criminals the green light 
(permission to go forward) to commit acts of crime, including armed robberies, 
drug trafficking and illegal gaming. Ostensibly, for many officers, unethical 
behaviour actually made sense in terms of discourse of the Service. An 
organizational ideology existed, in Fairclough’s (1989) terms: the sentiment 
that one has to do some evil in order to do good discursively framed their 
action. New employees gained an implicit understanding of what police 
actually do from such embedded discourse. More importantly, the Service’s use 
of terms such as ‘green lighting’ and ‘noble cause corruption’ provided a 
language with which to legitimize unethical behaviour.  
Our data shows that it was not only organizational discourse that shaped 
ethics but one of the Service’s most important nodal points of power – through 
which an “ordering of statements” (Kandall and Wickham, 1999) flowed. The 
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Operations Control and Review (OCR) meeting was situated as such a nodal 
point. The OCR was a formal meeting within which the Service’s senior 
management team coordinated and discussed the operational performance of 
each LAC. It was televised and broadcast to every command in the state. The 
meeting was a form of Electronic Panopticon in reverse: it did not exercise 
surveillance over all members but all members exercised surveillance over it as 
they watched it on CCTV in the Police Stations of the state. The meeting 
unequivocally framed the dominant modes of discourse prescribed by the 
highest level of the Service. It televised the most senior officers using the new 
rhetoric of reform, being publicly judged in its terms, while also having to 
provide accounts of crime and clear-up statistics in their command.  
In the OCR meetings the effect of power relations on the discursive 
construction of ethics could be most clearly seen. An officer gave testament to 
the OCR’s pervasive impact and infamous notoriety throughout the Service: 
… we are OCR driven; because, the OCRs are every four [or] five months. But even 
on the way home … from that OCR, you are thinking about how you can make sure 
that [in] the next one you're going to cover all your bases. And you really … you are 
trying to put into place short-term strategies to cater for long-term problems 
(Dwst05 Section 0, Paragraphs 101-119). 
As a Team Leader said, the enactment of the OCR, even in terms of its 
spatial arrangements, sent strong messages to all who saw it in action:  
 31 
Look at the structure of it … The place has two tables along the front, they 
[Commanders waiting to be questioned on their performance] are the heads on the 
block, you've got the Chiefs [Commissioner and his executive team] are out at the 
front and facing them [the Commanders with their head on the block], the rest of it 
is all audience and on the fringes, there are people around the edges, this guy is 
putting these huge big bloody graphs up on the walls saying ah, what have you done 
about your robberies in this area?  And the guy just sits there; it is just a big 
magnifying glass (Djtt23', Section 0, Paragraphs 161-211). 
While the OCR was designed to coordinate the operational performance 
of LACs, according to the comments of numerous officers, it appeared to be an 
arena in which senior executives reinforced their superiority by attacking and 
punishing Local Area Commanders, as attested to a Crime Manager:  
Inspectors and Superintendents go into these OCRs and being belittled by higher 
rank and they come back and it's embarrassing and belittling … and comments that 
I've heard is that, if we as police spoke to members of the public, the same way 
senior officers spoke to other officers, we would have a complaint brought against 
us (NB_tltm, Section 0, Paragraph 65). 
The focus on individuals rather than operations is also reflected in the 
previous officer’s use of the metaphor “heads on the block”, portraying the 
OCR as a setting for an execution (also see van Dijk 1997). And the officer’s 
comment that “it is just a big magnifying glass” indicates that the OCR was 
seen as a very public normalizing mechanism.  
These broadcasts and the subsequent ordering of statements framed the 
formation of a legitimate discourse of public attribution of individual 
responsibility for error. The scripts that were presented were evidently formally 
legitimated and approved. We found that the way things were said and done in 
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the OCR, particularly orders, commands and instructions, were being mirrored 
at lower levels of the organization. For instance, the field researcher witnessed 
one senior officer, while acting in the role of Commander at the Wallaroo LAC, 
make the following statement during a supervisor briefing session: “it is time 
for courageous leadership and that courageous leadership means letting them 
[members of the command] know that if they don’t want to do it our way then 
they are on their way [meaning fired or transferred to another command]” 
(Dm&dmf, Section 1.1.1.1, Paragraphs 258-263). The researcher noted that this 
statement had been used in a recent OCR meeting. Furthermore, in the week or 
two that followed, the researcher witnessed conversations between officers in 
the command that indicated that supervising officers had delivered very similar 
statements to them.  
What facilitated the creation of this ordering of statements was the 
televising of the proceedings; officers were seen being “grilled” – that is, 
ridiculed and abused. The OCR meeting was a prime medium through which 
officers in management positions throughout the Service were made aware of 
how to manage. Rather than leave space for dialogue, the OCR enforced an 
unambiguous and fact driven question-and-answer session that did not allow for 
ethically charged situations to be discussed. Responsibilities were attributed in 
a way that could not be evaded by qualified answers; in the absence of 
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qualification of accounts a crude empiricism of management only informed by 
quantitative facts prevailed. The facts were increasingly being represented in 
statistical terms as ‘clear-up’ rates and throughput of apprehensions. The 
creation of an OCR-driven organization that enacted itself within a discursive 
framework defined by the limited language of the OCR was not so much a 
solution to existing ethical issues but a further contribution to them.  
Viewing the OCR provided a temporal, spatial, personal and authoritative 
context that introduced a strict procedure for distributing responsibilities 
(Brunsson, 1994) in a uniquely public way in the Service. Consequently, the 
OCR served as a constraint on the discursive practices of officers in the Service 
that largely limited the sense that members were able to make of the non-
routine situations they experienced every day (Bittner, 1967). The OCR 
marginalized the interpretive problems that officers might experience on an 
everyday basis with ethics in practice and installed a ‘fact-driven’ discourse 
that, in its focus on results, did not allow for discussion of how these results 
were ethically achieved. Importantly, rather than being a catalyst for learning, 
the discursive practices of the OCR meetings were a mechanism for fixing 
blame that reinforced power relations and magnified potential problems that 
learning had not resolved into a public televisual space. Thus, on-screen, 
officers were able to make a judgement of the relative importance of the new 
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ethical commitment of the Service and the facts-driven discourse which 
stressed managing by the numbers. 
 The data discussed in this section significantly advances our 
understanding of how power relations were enacted in and through prevailing 
discourses, shaping ethics. Our data reveals that ethics were embedded in what 
had been the traditional power relationships in the Service rather than in the 
newly reformed relations of team-based authority.  These ethics were enacted in 
a discourse in which unethical and corrupt behaviour was seen as a means 
justified by its efficiency in achieving legitimate ends. The OCR meetings and 
the EMS were introduced as strategies and practices through which the 
Commissioner intended the Service to change. However, in practice, traditional 
power relations discursively continued to frame the boundaries of what was 
perceived as ethical and unethical behaviour (Fairclough, 1989).  What was 
regarded as ethical was what superiors tolerated in pursuit of a ‘good look’ in 
the OCR rather than that which the objectives of the reform agenda encouraged.  
The EMS and the OCR contributed to an ordering of statements that 
organized what was taken to be social reality within the Service. Even in the 
reformed Service, breaching the normalcy presumed in the ordering of 
statements established boundaries of discursive action that drew forth 
 35 
retaliation and punishment. The mechanisms for embedding reform as a new 
discourse through the EMS and the OCR did not reform the traditional, 
hierarchical power relations of dominance and differentiation but merely 
allowed them to reassert themselves in the new arenas.  
Discussion  
From an institutional perspective one could argue that it was no surprise that 
there was a gap between the reform rhetoric and organizational action. As 
Crank and Langworthy (1992) point out, external factors influence 
organizational activities and structures. In our case, there were important 
external forces at play. For instance, the reform program was mandated by the 
Royal Commission’s report that, in turn, was instigated by media, public and 
political pressure on government. The reform program responded to external 
pressures questioning the legitimacy of NSW Police Service practices. The 
reform program achieved its ceremonial purposes: government looked to be 
doing something about a widely perceived problem. The concept of “ethical 
and cost efficient policing” (Ryan, 2002) was a means of establishing 
legitimacy in the eyes of external stakeholders. It came about through the Police 
Commissioners reform response to the recommendations of the Wood Royal 
Commission. However, newly introduced practices such as the OCR and the 
 36 
EMS reinforced the very practices they were designed to diminish. The status 
quo and modus operandi were tacitly reinforced even as they were explicitly 
changed. In other words, highly visible initiatives like the EMS or the OCR 
were examples of legitimizing actions. What ultimately drove organizational 
members was not functional improvement of policing but maintaining the 
internal status quo and enhancing legitimacy vis-à-vis important stakeholders. 
The new practices that were introduced became the vehicle both for ceremonial 
adjustment internally and resistance to change – simultaneously.  
For instance, the OCR meeting meant that those officers watching it on 
police video and television interpreted the gaze (Foucault 1977) of 
Commissioner Ryan’s executive team. The practices through which the senior 
officials chose to exercise authority were more remarked upon than the senior 
officers’ role in implementing the reform agenda. The researchers interpreted 
the OCR broadcasts to mean that failure to conform was more punishable than 
the ability to reform. The EMS reinforced this conformance with perceived 
power relations: among junior officers speaking out against the old ways of 
corrupt practice was not encouraged by the new emphasis on ethical and 
efficient policing. ‘Old hands’ could produce praiseworthy results through what 
were implicitly known in their local context to be unethical means. The ends 
justified the means. Officers saw an elective affinity between deeply embedded, 
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local, and unethical practices and the official versions of the rational, right and 
just way to manage that they interpreted in the OCR and the EMS.  
Although the reform program emphasised ethical decision-making, it did 
not provide the Service’s members with a language with which to engage in 
ethical sensemaking.  Even after the reform agenda was introduced, the 
languages in use remained those of the old military model and the thin blue line 
of police lore. Consequently police officers did not have an available 
organizational forum in which they could discuss ambiguous experiences in 
terms of ethically charged situations. The new practices, including the EMS and 
the OCR, did not allow organizational members to articulate the uncertainties 
and messiness of these everyday organizational practices and their “bounded 
morality” (Donaldson and Dunfee, 1994). For instance, should one ‘green light’ 
a small dealer to catch the ‘big fish’ supplying the dealer? Is any collaboration 
with a dealer unethical, no matter what are the benefits of such an unethical 
alliance? From this perspective, one had to do some ‘evil’ in order to do ‘good’ 
(to catch the big fish and meet performance management targets).  
We argue that the Service’s management and its change strategies, 
especially, the EM and the OCR, did not address the complexity of these ethical 
issues, or the ethical dilemmas.  Instead it maintained a black and white world 
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in which there ‘should’ be only ‘good’ cops and ‘bad’ criminals. No formal 
contexts in which the more complex stories of right and wrong could be told 
were available other than those which were a part of the new reforms – the 
OCR and the EMS – and these were flawed by the ways in which they did what 
they said. Acting ethically in a complex world requires an adequately complex 
discursive repertoire. In contrast, the language of the NSW Police Service 
created a world of ‘good’ cops, ‘bad’ criminals and ‘clear’ rules for ‘good’ 
ethics. An unambiguous language of reform met a reality of ambiguous 
practices on the streets, in the bars, and the cells. The reform language did not 
frame the working police officers’ milieu and sense of their selves as subjects 
up against tough people, in a tough job. The scripts of the street ran counter to 
those of the reform sheets.  
Speaking more generally, we can learn from our study that organizational 
micro-practices powerfully shape the embedded ethical context. Organizational 
ethics is constructed in and through those micro-practices that shape conduct. 
As local actors make sense of events their language frames their capacity to 
reflect on behaviour as ethical. From our case it follows that although it might 
be tempting for ethical theory and practice to develop clear principles and 
guidelines, it will often not help organizational actors to make decisions in situ. 
Practice is complex: this will apply to a police organization as much as to any 
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other organization. Ethics that try to manage morally correct behaviour will 
have to provide a language that is capable of mapping this complexity. 
Otherwise, as happened in the NSW Police Service, ethicality will disappear 
between the spaces; in this case, between the scripts of the street and those of 
the reform sheets. Hence we can partly answer our research question: it is 
organizational micro-practices, enacted in discourse and embedded in power 
relations that shape ethics in practice. But we need to complement this finding 
theoretically further by looking at its relation with institutional power effects.    
 Our discussion demonstrates that what was framed as desirable and 
ambitious change project (“ethical and efficient policing”) was defined 
institutionally; how these changes were appropriated and made sense of 
occurred in situated practices.  Institutionally, the reform agenda was a response 
to a crisis of confidence in the Service. Revelations flowing from the Wood 
Commission were a public relations disaster for the Service and its overseers in 
government
2
. Even in moments of crisis instigated by public relations disasters 
and pressure the system remained stuck in the old, default ways of doing things 
as change initiatives were quickly integrated into “the dark side” (Vaughan, 
1999). Research into resistance to change suggests such behaviour as normal 
(Collinson 1994; Tilly 1991; Sewell 1998).  
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The new practices such as the EMS and the OCR were ostensibly neutral 
and technical means to achieve reform by instituting new routines. Feldman and 
Pentland (2003) have argued that routines can be both, a source of change as 
well as stability. According to their theory, routines have ostensive aspects 
which represent structure but they also have a performative aspect that brings 
routines to life. They argue that “the ostensive aspect enables people to guide, 
account for, and refer to specific performances of a routine, and the 
performative aspect creates, maintains, and modifies the ostensive aspect of the 
routine. We argue that the relationship between ostensive and performative 
aspects of routines creates an on-going opportunity for variation, selection, and 
retention of new practices ….” (Feldman and Pentland, 2003: 94).  In our case 
study, new practices such as the OCR and the EMS were quickly absorbed into 
old routines. The ostensive dimension of routines dominated; the performative 
dimension was kept under control by the limited discursive repertoire that 
young employees, especially, had to make sense of or modify routines. As 
Feldman and Pentland suggest, performative variation and change only occurs 
when members of the organization describe these variations as legitimate 
instances of the ostensive aspect of the routine. However, legitimacy was 
framed by the historically constituted power relations that dominated the 
Service. Thus, one extension of Feldman and Pentland’s work (2003) is to take 
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into account how power shapes people’s ability and willingness to perform 
routines creatively; any theory of (ethical) change must take such power 
relations into account.  
Here we find the complementary answer to our research question: old 
practices moulded new initiatives such as the EMS and the OCR in ways that, 
rather than achieving ethically accountable and transparent policing 
paradoxically reinforced prior power relations. Hence our story could be 
interpreted as one of failed planned change … up to a point. From an 
institutional perspective, it wasn’t: rather the change program did legitimate the 
Police Service and its management in the eyes of the immediate external 
environment. The reforms allowed Commissioner Ryan and his team to argue 
that they were doing what was possible to change the Service
3
. Internally, the 
reform necessarily allowed subordinates and superiors room to interpret 
vaguely formulated objectives such as “efficient and ethical policing”. As we 
have shown, the interpretations of the reform as implemented in the OCR and 
the EMS reinforced the established status quo. Paradoxically the Service 
achieved both, ceremonial adaptation to environmental pressure as well as 
maintenance of the status quo internally. The ethics of the Service were shaped 
though both micro- and macro-power relations that are, in reality, inseparable. 
Institutionalized practices such as the OCR and the EMS act as relays that 
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translates the realities of everyday policing and external pressures to change. In 
conclusion, these are the forms of power that shape ethics in practice. Focus on 
either of them – as practiced in most contemporary theorizing on ethics in 
organizations – will not do justice to the complexities and ambiguities of ethics.           
Conclusion 
Before we draw some conclusions from our research it is important to point out 
the limitations of our study. First, it is a study of just one police service. 
However, it is research into a highly significant organization.  The NSW Police 
Service is the world’s third largest police force, and it is not unrepresentative. 
There is little evidence to suggest that the NSW Police Service was an 
aberration because it was corrupt. Other forces in Australia (in Victoria most 
recently in 2007 and Queensland in the 1980s) have been revealed as equally 
corrupt, as have the Metropolitan Police in the UK, the Hong Kong Police, the 
NYPD and the LAPD at various stages in their histories (Gordon, 2007). 
Police organizations are not the only type of coercive organization that 
state governments use to maintain order. As Victor and Cullen (1988) have 
shown, organizational form is a major determinant of ethical climate.  There are 
many military-style organizations, including customs and immigration services, 
fire fighters and coast guards. Such organizations often struggle with the legacy 
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of their quasi-militaristic past, and seek to change to flatter, more empowered 
organization forms as they adopt technologies that demand change. Although 
we acknowledge the limitations of the Service’s particulars, such as its 
Australian identity, its being a police organization and a solitary case study, our 
findings can be used to understand other organizational contexts in different 
industries and countries. The processes highlighted are not confined to coercive 
organizations since discursive power is at play in all organizations. Hence, we 
propose that ethics in other corporate and public organizations will also be 
framed by discursive power. 
Ethics will always be shaped by power relations that are deeply embedded 
in organization practices, even when the rhetoric of the discourses shifts. The 
NSW Police Service’s introduction of reform initiatives such as the EMS had 
the unintended consequence of reinforcing established power relations even as 
it changed the apparent structures of authority. Similarly the strong power 
effects of the discourse promoted by and through the OCR undermined the 
objective of a more ethically sound organization. Both examples show how 
language and practice are inextricably intertwined – changing the formal 
rhetoric but implementing it through practices that are less critically reflexive 
has powerful effects on an organization and its members. Furthermore, our 
study highlights the importance of institutional pressures on organizations, and 
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how external legitimacy and survival can be sustained by ceremonial 
performances.      
While ethics might be associated with contractual arrangements or 
principles such as the ‘Good’ and the ‘Just’, we argue that ethics will be forged 
in the midst of power relations, embedded in practice, and enacted in members’ 
discourses (Nietzsche, 1969). Future research might focus on how 
organizational members discursively construct the ethicality of situations, for 
example, how a problem becomes initially framed as an ethical issue. Many 
organizational members did not see ‘green lighting’ petty criminals as a 
potentially ethically dubious practice if it helped them to catch other criminals. 
However, after the Royal Commission, pressure from the external environment 
questioned the practice as unethical. Once this happened, organizational 
members had to make sense of “green lighting” through a new language. The 
new language created tensions in the organization with past power relations and 
historical patterns of rationality. Research should start with the tensions that a 
new language of change introduces rather than judging changing practices 
normatively as ethical or unethical (Margolis and Walsh 2002; Philipsen, 
1989/1990). Moreover, future research should focus not only on institutional 
pressures to behave more ethically, expressed in formal reform programs, but 
also on how these expectations become appropriated in practice. Based on our 
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analysis, we would suggest that such change and reform programs can, 
paradoxically, support old practices while still creating new legitimacies. In the 
case of the NSW Police Service, it was necessary to gain re-legitimization from 
the external environment. However, the way in which the policies associated 
with re-legitimization were implemented in practice meant that the Service 
appropriated the reform in ways that failed to reconcile the contradictions that 
reform produced. 
Our study has important implications for the practice of managing ethics. 
In response to ethical challenges new rules are often proposed to manage ethics. 
However, every change program has to deal with the gaps between structural 
innovations, the use of these innovations, and organizational members’ 
sensemaking. Organizations should place more emphasis on peer dynamics and 
culture than on trying to prescribe law-like codes of conducts. Looking at codes 
of conduct, while important, may not be sufficient. Attempts to change ethics 
need to build on an understanding of power practices at work as well as the 
power effects of the institutional environment. Compliance perspectives on 
ethics take power relations for granted rather than understanding them as 
crucial to the process of making sense of rules and situated contexts. 
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Typically, official organizational rhetoric defines the status quo as ethical 
practice. Our study offers an interesting and important counterfactual – here the 
status quo was the informal corrupt organization embedded in practice rather 
than that represented by the formal ethics of the Service. From this perspective 
an approach that locates ethical responsibility only in the individual 
organizational member’s character is limited. Rather, ethics are at stake in day-
to-day practices and in the learned and routine ways of doing things.  
Our study has shown how ethics are re- and de-contextualized through 
organizational practices. These practices not only embed and enact ethics but 
also form the framework for their institutionalization, politicization and 
contestation. Ethics imply power as much as power implies ethics. An ethics 
innocent of power is an ethics of ignorance: power is always implicated with 
ethical discourse and practices. On a discursive level, ethics is a mechanism to 
name, categorize and solve human problems; from a practice perspective, ethics 
do not exist as entities or things but only exist when they are enacted in 




                                                 
1
 These codes are used to disguise the identity of the respondents and enable the researcher to 
locate the data in the overall dataset. 
2
 The starting points for disasters are often embedded in culturally and institutionally accepted 
norms (see Turner, 1978; Beamish, 2000; Vaughan, 1981-1982; 1990, 1999). As Vaughan 
(1999: 274) argues, drawing on Durkheim, deviance is a routine nonconformity and a 
predictable product of all organizations (see also Canguilhem 1968). In Vaughan’s words, “the 
same characteristics of a system that produce the bright side will regularly provoke the dark 
side ...” (1999: 274). 
3
 For a while it seemed as if the Commissioner had pulled off the ceremonial institutional side 
of myth-making. It was the reforms that were making the front pages and the ‘roll-overs’ of the 
Royal Commission, where corrupt police who had been caught through detailed surveillance  
were encouraged to give evidence against other corrupt officers, were receding in public 
memory. Unfortunately, however, this was before the television career of one of Commissioner 
Ryan’s  officers, chief of detectives, Graham "Chook" Fowler, became public . Chook Fowler 
was a big man of few words. Many of them, to judge from the video evidence obtained from the 
hidden camera in his car, started with 'f' and ended in 'k'. Few people knew him before his 
unanticipated appearance on the newscasts, apart from his colleagues in the New South Wales 
(NSW) Police Service, his family, neighbours and friends. Among the latter were members of 
Sydney’s criminal fraternity. Indeed, many of these were such good friends that they regularly 
paid him off, through one of his mates, Trevor Haken, an officer junior to Chook. Everyday 
organizational life in the NSW Police Service in which Chook and Trevor were players 
resembled a Hollywood script. In his own words, Trevor Haken, who 'rolled over' to present 
evidence against his erstwhile mates, said: 
“The corrupt were really my heroes and – as they were with everybody because the 
corrupt were the working detectives and ... they say that the police force is the thin 
blue line – really what they mean is the line between criminals and society is the thin 
blue line...”(Four Corners, ABC Television, Training Day, Reporter: Chris Masters, 
Broadcast: July 26, 2004) 
Not long after these events became public the Commissioner resigned his commission and a 
new Commissioner was appointed by the Government with an explicit brief to keep negative 
stories about policing off the front pages and television. This has not proved to be the case, as a 
summary article from 2007 (http://www.smh.com.au/news/national/holding-
judgement/2007/06/08/1181089328815.html) suggests.   
